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THE PARADOX OF THE MISUSE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN
ERISA BENEFIT CLAIMS
MARK D. DEBOFSKY*

The ERISAl law was enacted by Congress to
protect participants in employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information
with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and
2
ready access to the Federal courts.

To that end, the statute affords every participant 3 and
beneficiary 4 of employee benefit plans 5 the right to bring suit "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
reinforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan."6 However,
the civil procedure accorded to such suits has been deformed by
the courts' mistaken application of an administrative law
paradigm to ERISA benefits litigation instead of utilizing the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as those rules are to be applied to

" Partner, DALEY, DEBOFSKY & BRYANT, Chicago, Illinois and
Adjunct
Professor, John Marshall Law School, Center for Employee Benefits, Chicago,
Illinois
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et
seq. (2000).
2. Id. § 1001(b) (2000).
3. Id. § 1002(7) (2000). A "participant" in an employee benefit plan
"means any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or
former member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to
receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers
employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose
beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such benefit." Id.
4. Id. § 1002(8) (2000) defines "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a
participant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become
entitled to a benefit thereunder."
5. Id. § 1002(1)(A) (2000). Defined as a plan, fund or program established
or maintained by an employer to provide benefits in the event of illness,
disability or certain other conditions. Plans may be funded "through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise." Id.
6. Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
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all civil litigation 7 brought in the United States District Courts.

I.

EARLY WARNINGS AGAINST THE USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW PARADIGM TO RESOLVE BENEFITS CLAIMS

On their journey toward developing the law of ERISA, federal
courts have somehow lost their way despite warnings by several
learned judges.
Two sources for the misapplication of
administrative law principles are: the utilization of a deferential
standard of review and the doctrine of administrative exhaustion.
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review was adopted by
the courts in ERISA cases as an outgrowth both of trust law and
the Labor Management Relations Act.8 However, Judge Richard
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit questioned the potential for harm that could result from
applying a deferential standard of review in ERISA cases. He
wrote in Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust,9
a pension benefits dispute,
pension rights are too important these days for most employees to
want to place them at the mercy of a biased tribunal subject only to
a narrow form of "arbitrary and capricious" review, relying on the
company's interest in its reputation to prevent it from acting on its
bias. Nor is it clear that the contractual perspective is the correct
one in which to view claims under ERISA. A Congress committed to
the principles of freedom of contract would not have enacted a
statute that interferes with pension arrangements voluntarily
agreed on by employers and employees. ERISA is paternalistic; and
it seems incongruous therefore to deny disappointed pension
claimants a meaningful degree of judicial review on the theory that
they might be said to have implicitly waived it:

7. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. The Rule states, "These rules govern the procedure in
the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty[.]" Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (2000). Courts interpreting benefits cases brought
under the Taft-Hartley Act, which provided for joint employer-union benefit
plans, adopted the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review of benefits
decisions rendered by such plans, a standard imported into ERISA. Van Boxel
v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987).
The philosophy behind that approach was to challenge benefits decisions on
the ground the plan was not "structured" for "the sole and exclusive benefit of
the employees." Id. at 1052. Tracing the history of the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard further, Judge Posner pointed out that under the
common law, trustees, who are forbidden to engage in self dealing, were
accorded judicial deference to their "discretionary judgments." Id. at 1051; see
also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (tracing
history of development of arbitrary and capricious standard of review in
ERISA cases).
9. 836 F.2d at 1052.
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Transposed to the ERISA setting, the arbitrary and capricious
standard may be inapt, a historical mistake, or a mechanical
extrapolation from different settings, at once too lax and too
stringent, but even if it is any or all of these things it is saved from
doing serious harm by its vagueness and elasticity.10
Further, Judge Posner was also careful to note that despite
the derivation of the arbitrary and capricious standard from
administrative law,
Pension fund trusts are not administrative agencies and most of the
decisions they make are not discretionary in the sense, familiar from
administrative law, of decisions that make policy under a broad
grant of delegated powers. Certainly in a case such as the present
one, pension fund trustees are not policy-makers; they are
interpreters of contractual entitlements. 11
Judge Posner expressed that it might be more apt to compare
ERISA benefit plan administrators to arbitrators, but before
granting trustees the same .authority as arbitrators, their
12
objectivity and neutrality is required.
After
Van Boxel, the next case to warn of the
inappropriateness of applying an administrative law paradigm to
litigation of ERISA benefits disputes was the seminal ruling in
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.,13 a case
challenging the denial of hospitalization benefits. Pointing out the
insurer's conflict of interest as both administrator of benefits and
payor of claims, the Eleventh Circuit refused to accord any
deference to the insurer's refusal to pay benefits, and required the
conflicted party to "prove that its interpretation of plan provisions
committed to its discretion was not tainted by self-interest."'14 The
court also warned of the misuse of administrative law concepts:
Because we have restated the standard as arbitrary and capricious,
the temptation exists to consult precedent regarding the use of that
standard to review administrative agency decisions [citations
omitted]. We express caution, however, at wholesale importation of
administrative agency concepts into the review of ERISA fiduciary
decisions. Use of the administrative agency analogy may, ironically,
give too much deference to ERISA fiduciaries. Decisions in the
ERISA context involve the interpretation of contractual

10. Id. (citing Lee v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 604 F. Supp. 987, 1001
n.11 (S.D. Ohio 1985)).
11. Id. at 1050.
12. Id. at 1051. Judge Posner suggested deference be granted to decisions
made by true trustees, while a de novo standard of review would be required if
absolute neutrality was not present, especially if there was a conflict of
interest. Id.
13. 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 1566.
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entitlements; they 'are not discretionary in the sense, familiar from
administrative law, of decisions that make policy under a broad
grant of delegated powers.' Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1050. Moreover,
the individuals who occupy the position of ERISA fiduciaries are less
well-insulated from outside pressures than are decisionmakers at
government agencies. [citation omitted]. We therefore concentrate
on the common law trust principles to evaluate the application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard. 15
The
most recent
warning
about misapplication
of
administrative law concepts to ERISA claims was once again
authored by Judge Posner. In Herzberger v. Standard Insurance
16
Co.,
a case involving disability insurance benefits, the court
denied deference to an insurer due to the absence of clearlydrafted language reserving discretion to determine eligibility for
Explaining that deference should not
benefit payments. 17
automatically be granted, Judge Posner suggested the reason that
courts had gone astray:
What may have misled courts in some cases is the analogy between
judicial review of an ERISA plan administrator's decision to deny
disability benefits and judicial review of the denial of such benefits
by the Social Security Administration ... Judicial review of the
latter sort of denial is of course deferential, and it is natural to
suppose that it should be deferential in the former case as well. But
the analogy is imperfect, quite apart from its having been implicitly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch'8 when it determined that the default standard of review in
ERISA cases is plenary review, and quite apart from the fact that
the social security statute specifies deferential ("substantial
evidence") review.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Social Security
Administration is a public agency that denies benefits only after
giving the applicant an opportunity for a full adjudicative hearing
The
before a judicial officer, the administrative law judge.
procedural safeguards thus accorded, designed to assure a full and
fair hearing, are missing from determinations by plan
administrators. 19

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT IN ERISA
CASES
Despite these
admonitions, the federal courts have
mistakenly incorporated administrative law principles into ERISA
benefit decisions. The use of the term "administrator" 20 in the
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See id. at 1564 n.7 (quoting Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1050).
205 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 331.
489 U.S. 101.
See 205 F.3d at 332 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (2000).
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ERISA statute has allowed other terminology to creep into ERISA,
such as "administrative record."21 Perhaps much of the confusion
results from Section 50322 of the ERISA statute, which states:
In accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee
benefit plan shall
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or
beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan has been
denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial, written
in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant, and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose
the
claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by 23
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.
That provision was interpreted in Amato v. Bernard24 to require
administrative exhaustion prior to suit in the same manner that
courts have applied exhaustion of administrative procedures to
25
resolution of disputes under collective bargaining agreements.
The court explained that Section 503 was:
apparently intended by Congress to help reduce the number of
frivolous lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent
treatment of claims for benefits; to provide a nonadversarial method
and to minimize the costs of claims settlement
of claims settlement;
26
for all concerned.
As pointed out, though, by Professor Jay Conison in his article
Suits for Benefits Under ERISA,27 the use of the word "apparently"
is without support in the statutory history of the ERISA law. At
one point, the statutory history reveals that Congress planned to
have the Department of Labor hear grievances or disputes relating
to pensions under an earlier version of the ERISA law. 28 Another
proposal was to provide for arbitration of disputes. 29 However,
neither provision was retained in the final bill. Consequently,

21. See, e.g., Wade v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12320
(D. Me. June 3, 2003) (granting a disability insurer operating an ERISAgoverned benefit plan summary judgment under a ruling titled, "Order
Regarding Judgment on the Administrative Record"); see also Bently v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12973 (W.D. Mich. July 18, 2003)
(granting "Judgment on the Administrative Record" due to plaintiffs failure to
exhaust administrative remedies).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
23. Id.
24. 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. Id. at 566.
26. Id. at 567.
27. 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 29 (1992).
28. S.REP. No. 93-383, at 116-17 (1974).
29. 120 CONG. REC. 29,941 (1974).
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although the notion that ERISA disputes are "review" proceedings
has been maintained as the result of cases such as Amato v.
Bernard, no court since Amato has been willing to state that
administrative exhaustion is simply an option available to
claimants for benefits.
The closest a court has come to that viewpoint is the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Gallegos v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center.30 In
Gallegos, the court pointed out that an disability insurer's
invitation to appeal an adverse decision was couched in precatory
language; i.e., "you may appeal."31 The court then noted,
In this case, UNUM attempted to comply with the requirements of
ERISA by informing Gallegos of her options to pursue relief of the
denial of her claim through UNUM's administrative review
procedure as well as through the federal court system. Gallegos
asserts, however, that what UNUM did not tell her was that if she
elected not to pursue an administrative review of her claim, UNUM
would use this choice as a defense against her in any subsequent
federal suit. We agree with Gallegos that the use of phrases such as
"you may have [your claim] reviewed," "should you desire a review,"
"if you.., wish to have the decision reviewed," and "you... may
appeal," given their plain meaning, indicate that a plan participant
has the opportunity to participate in a voluntary, rather than
mandatory, review procedure. The only penalty mentioned for
failure to submit to administrative review is that the claims decision
will become "final." There is no indication that this "finality" may
have consequences for the bringing of a suit in federal court, an
option which the claimant is also informed she "may" pursue. A
natural reading of the plain language of the Summary Plan and
June 11 Letter is that both a court suit and an administrative
appeal are voluntary options for review of a denial of a claim. The
administrative appeal has a limitations period of 60 days from the
denial of the claim, and the limitations period for a court suit, while
not defined in the Summary Plan, is stated in the Plan as three
32
years from the time when proof of a claim is required.
Nonetheless, the court addressed the issue in terms of an
estoppel and ultimately ruled that the plaintiffs failure to
establish that she was misled by the terminology of the summary
plan and denial letter barred her suit. 33 However, the court was

definitely on the right track since § 503 of the statute is not, by its
own terminology, a mandatory provision for claimants. Yet no
other court has been willing to stray from the doctrine of
administrative exhaustion in ERISA claims.

30. 210 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000).
31. Gallegos, 210 F.3d at 810.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 808.
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III. FIRESTONE V. BRUCH
Whatever hope existed that the courts would regain their
bearings and exclude administrative law concepts from ERISA
claims was demolished by the Supreme Court in its watershed
ruling in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.34 There, the Court
held that although the default standard of review in ERISA cases
is plenary, trust principles allow a trustee exercising discretionary
authority to reserve deferential authority to determine eligibility
for benefits and construe the terms of a benefit plan. However, the
Court also made a number of other crucial points in the Bruch
ruling that are inconsistent with the Court's application of trust
law. First, the Court explained that the preservation of a de novo
standard of review continues the means by which employee benefit
claims were resolved prior to ERISA since such claims "were
governed by principles of contract law." 35 Thus, the de novo
standard of review retains consistency with the ERISA law's
protective purpose; otherwise, a blanket deferential standard of
review would "impose a standard of review that would afford less
protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed
before ERISA was enacted." 36 Finally, the Court rejected the fears
expressed by Firestone that a de novo review could increase the
cost of litigation by finding the threat of increased costs does not
37
outweigh the legal basis for granting a de novo review.
Nonetheless, the Court then determined that principles of trust
law allow benefit plan sponsors to simply write into their plans
language that would trigger a deferential standard of review. The
Court further indicated, though, without any guidance whatsoever
to the lower courts, that if the fiduciary or plan administrator of a
benefit plan is operating under a conflict of interest, the conflict
38
must be weighed as a "factor" in determining abuse of discretion.
IV. CRITICISM OF FIRESTONE

Firestone'sholding was attacked by Professor John Langbein

in his article entitled, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts. 39
Langbein argued the Court should have either followed trust or
contract law, but instead the Court made a mish-mash of both.
Langbein maintains:
If the Court had been worried that a contract-based standard of de

34. 489 U.S. at 118.
35. Id. at 112.
36. Id. at 114.
37. Id. at 115.
38. See id. at 115 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUST § 187, Comm. d
(1959)).
39. 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 208-09 (1990).
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novo review might be too easy for plan drafters to evade, ERISA
offered an easy statutory basis for preventing such maneuvers.
Section 404(a)(1)(D)-the measure that requires that plan
documents be "consistent with the provisions of' ERISA could easily
have been read to restrict or prohibit attempts to oust de novo
review, at least in situations of conflict of interest. Moreover, quite
apart from statute, contract law is not defenseless to such moves
when protective values are offended. Just as trust law exhibits that
tradition of strict scrutiny of a fiduciary's conflict-tainted
transactions upon which Judge Becker [the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals Judge who wrote the appellate court ruling in Bruch prior
to its reaching the Supreme Court] relied, so in contract law there
are familiar doctrines-unconscionability, contra proferentum-for
40
responding to overreaching.
Professor Langbein's approach has never been accepted by
any court. While well argued, and despite presenting points that
remain worthy of consideration, the Solicitor General's arguments
made to the Supreme Court in Firestone41 are ultimately more
persuasive. This is partly because Professor Langbein appears not
to have taken into consideration that, particularly in the area of
welfare benefits, the statute allows for the existence of unfunded
benefit plans, 42 i.e., plans that fund benefits from an employer's
general assets, rather than money held in trust, or plans that fund
benefit payments through the purchase of insurance.
The Solicitor General, recognizing the existence of unfunded
employer-controlled or insurer-controlled plans under the ERISA
law, argued for a universal de novo standard of review as being
consistent with ERISA's purposes.
The Solicitor General
explained that ERISA's purposes of protecting promised benefits
are best served by not insulating benefit plans from the selfinterest of employers and insurers through a deferential standard
of review. The Solicitor General contended, "[i]t is illogical to
assume that the administrator of an unfunded plan whose benefits
are paid from the employer's assets will function with the same
impartiality as a neutral trustee of 'a funded plan, since the
administrator's employer will sustain a financial loss with every
award of benefits." 43 The same argument applies to insurers. The
40. See id. at 227 (citing Bruch, 828 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 1987)).
41. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1988) (No. 87-1054), 1987
U.S. Briefs 1054 LEXIS.
42. See Langbein, supra note 37, at 209 (stating that "ERISA requires that
pension and employee benefits take the trust form"). However, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(1), which contains the statutory definition of "welfare plan," explicitly
contemplates "the purchase of insurance." Moreover, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081(a)(1)
and (a)(2) exempt welfare plans and insured plans from maintaining plan
assets in trust.
43. Id.
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Solicitor further noted that trust analogies "are wholly inapt to an
unfunded benefit plan... since no source of benefit payments
44
exists separately from the employer's own operating funds."
Consequently, the Solicitor General sought the use of a
contract law approach, citing numerous pre-ERISA cases deciding
employee benefits disputes as breach of contract cases brought in
the state courts. 45
Certainly, welfare benefits cases have
historically been resolved as contractual disputes. 46 Further,
while many cases brought prior to the enactment of the ERISA law
applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to trust
disputes, 47 a deferential standard of review was not universally
applied.
In In re Trust Created by Will of Salimes, 48 a
testamentary trust providing authority "to financially assist any of
the grandchildren," in the trusee's discretion, "with a higher
education subsequent to high school and that such financial
assistance for such higher educations may be over and above the
amounts paid to her son," was held not to grant discretion to the
trustee to refuse a grandchild's request to transfer from one
educational institution to another. 49 The court overturned the
trustee's determination, holding:
The mere fact that a trustee is given discretion does not authorize
him to go beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment.
1
Restatement 2d, Trusts, p. 403, sec. 187, comment e. In general, a
court does not favor a construction which confers arbitrary or
capricious authority on the trustee. See Annot. (1948), 2 A.L.R. 2d
1383, 1400 et seq. The general duties of a trustee to exercise
reasonable care and judgment require that even a broad discretion
be exercised upon judicious and responsible consideration, subject to
review by the court for abuse of discretion. 54 AM. JUR., Trusts, p.
142, sec. 180.50
The import of the foregoing discussion is that despite the
Solicitor General's argument and historic practice, the Supreme
Court's Firestone decision provides insurers and employers

44. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054).
45. See id. (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Brown, 540 P.2d 651 (Ariz. 1975);
Frietzsche v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 336 P.2d 589 (Cal. App. 1959))
(additional citations omitted).
46. See, e.g., Moore v. John Hancock, 436 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1971)
(regarding life insurance); Justice v. Union Carbide, 405 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975) (regarding disability benefits).
47. E.g., Van Pelt v. Berefco, Inc., 208 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. App. 1965); Reese v.
Admin. Comm. of the Profit Sharing Trust, 32 Cal. Rptr. 818 (Cal. App. 1963);
Going v. S. Mill Employees' Trust, 281 P.2d 762 (Okla. 1955).
48. 168 N.W.2d 157 (Wis. 1969).
49. Id. at 158-59.
50. Id. at 160.
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offering unfunded benefit plans unfettered discretion to impose a
deferential standard of review on all ERISA plan participants and
their beneficiaries. However, since Firestone, the courts have not
consistently applied the trust law view of an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, which would still allow for discovery
and a court hearing. Instead, the courts have deviated from
tradition trust law and imposed administrative law concepts
relating to review of agency determinations, and have disallowed
the usual civil procedures.
V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF ERISA CLAIMS
The fact that, as a historical matter, cases involving employee
benefits have been determined as contract disputes raises a
question as to how the administrative law paradigm began to be
utilized in ERISA benefit claims. While we have seen how trust
law concepts have been applied to the standard of court review,
one of the influential decisions applying the administrative law
paradigm to the scope of a court's review is Perry v. Simplicity
Engineering,51 a disability benefits dispute. In Perry, without any
precedential support, the court determined that review of ERISA
benefit claims is "based on the record before the administrator." 52
The court found:
In the ERISA context, the role of the reviewing federal court is to
determine whether the administrator or fiduciary made a correct
decision, applying a de novo standard. Nothing in the legislative
history suggests that Congress intended that federal district courts
would function as substitute plan administrators, a role they would
inevitably assume if they received and considered evidence not
presented to administrators concerning an employee's entitlement to
benefits. Such a procedure would frustrate the goal of prompt
resolution of claims by the fiduciary under the ERISA scheme. 53
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit, in Moon v. American Home
54
Assurance Co.,
determined that a
contention that a court conducting a de novo review must examine
only such facts as were available to the plan administrator at the
time of the benefits denial is contrary to the concept of a de novo
review. During oral argument, American Home's counsel conceded
that absent ERISA, there would be no deferential standard of
review of the denial of coverage. Thus, what the Supreme Court
said of a similar contention advanced in Firestone is equally
applicable to this contention: "Adopting [this] reading of ERISA
would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford
51.
52.
53.
54.

900 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 967.
Id. at 966.
888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989).
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less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than [they
55
enjoyed] before ERISA was enacted.'
Disagreeing with Moon, and characterizing that ruling as
inconsistent with ERISA's purpose of providing "a method for
workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over benefits
inexpensively and expeditiously," 56 Perry determined that
consideration of evidence not previously presented to plan
administrators would cause "employees and their beneficiaries [to]
57
receive less protection than Congress intended."
Trying to find a middle ground, the court in Luby v.
Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust Funds8 held the
admissible evidence did not have to be limited to the claim record
before the plan administrator. Then the court in Quesinberry v.
Life Insurance Co. of North America59 counseled an approach
which allowed a court, in its discretion, to consider evidence not
before the plan administrator "because of concerns about
impartiality and ERISA's interest in providing protection for
employees and their beneficiaries." 60
The test proposed in
Quesinberry was to allow for additional evidence under
"exceptional circumstances," catalogued to include:
claims that require consideration of complex medical questions or
issues regarding the credibility of medical experts; the availability of
very limited administrative review procedures with little or no
evidentiary record; the necessity of evidence regarding
interpretation of the terms of the plan rather than specific historical
facts; instances where the payor and the administrator are the same
entity and the court is concerned about impartiality; claims which
would have been insurance contract claims prior to ERISA; and
circumstances in which there is additional evidence that the
61
claimant could not have presented in the administrative process.
However, Quesinberry's approach only applies to de novo
review. For review under an arbitrary and capricious standard,
the Seventh Circuit stated starkly in Perlman v. Swiss Bank
Corp.6 2 that "[d]eferential review of an administrative decision
means review on the administrative record." 63

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. (citing Firestone, 109 U.S. at 956).
900 F.2d at 967 (citing 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5000).
Id.
944 F.2d 1176, 1187 (3d Cir. 1991).
987 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
195 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 981-82.
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VI. WHY ADMINISTRATIVE LAw CONCEPTS ARE INAPPROPRIATE

But as Herzberger v. Standard Insurance Co. recognized, the
administrative law analogy is flawed. Administrative law allows
for limited review of agency decisions because administrative
agencies apply trial-type procedures leading to adjudications
before a neutral factfinder with a right to subpoena witnesses and
present evidence. Indeed, the federal Administrative Procedure
Act 64 guarantees a hearing with due process protections. Looking
at the Social Security process as an example, the case of
Richardson v. Perales65 explains
that
Social
Security
determinations, which are reviewed deferentially pursuant to
statute, 66 are not litigated de novo in federal court because of the
protections afforded the claimant before the administrative
agency. Those protections include the right to a neutral hearing
officer and the opportunity to subpoena and cross-examine the
authors of adverse reports.
Articulating the reasons behind the administrative law
approach to judicial review of agency determinations, Judge Henry
Friendly pointed out in his landmark law review article, Some
67
Kind of Hearing,
that several elements are necessary for a fair
administrative hearing: 1) an unbiased tribunal; 2) notice of the
proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; 3) an opportunity
to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; 4)
the right to call witnesses, including the right to cross-examine
adverse witnesses; 5) the right to know the evidence at issue; 6)
the right to have a decision based on the evidentiary record; 7) the
right to counsel; 8) a record; 9) articulated reasons for the decision;
68
10) public attendance; and 11) judicial review.
Although the ERISA claim regulations 69 provide many of
these guarantees, 70 the most crucial protections are denied ERISA
claimants. This occurs especially with claims brought under
insurance policies or which involve unfunded benefits since the
claim review process lacks the neutrality afforded by funded plans,
as Judge Posner noted in Van Boxel.7 1 Such claims are not
presented to an unbiased tribunal; and claimants lack any
opportunity to challenge adverse evidence through cross-

64. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2003).
65. 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2003).
67. 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975).

68. Id.
69. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2004).
70. Id.

The Regulations provide claimants with the opportunity to know

what evidence was relied on, to submit a written response, and to receive a full
and fair review of the initial claim decision. Id.
71. 836 F.2d at 1052.
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examination. Another significant problem was pointed out in
Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust Funds,72
where the court explained:
Plan administrators are not governmental agencies who are
frequently granted deferential review because of their acknowledged
expertise. Administrators may be laypersons appointed under the
plan, sometimes without any legal, accounting or other training
preparing them for their responsible position, often without any
experience in or understanding of the complex problems arising
under ERISA, and, as this case demonstrates, little knowledge of
the rules of evidence or legal procedures to assist them in
73
factfinding.
The Seventh Circuit elaborated on that theme in Ramsey v.
Hercules, Inc.,74 where the court adhered to a plenary evaluation of
a disability benefit claim, rejecting the insurer's contention that
factual determinations made by a plan administrator should
always be accorded deference. Finding that policy considerations
militated against such an approach, the court ruled:
Crucial differences exist between findings of fact made by a private
entity such as a plan administrator, and findings made by duly
authorized administrative law judges, agencies, or federal district
courts. Underlying the deferential review that fact findings of the
latter bodies enjoy is a well established set of procedural protections
that stem from the Constitution and individual statutes. Plan
administrators, in contrast, neither enjoy the acknowledged
expertise that justifies deferential review for agency cases, see Luby,
944 F.3d at 1183, nor are they unbiased fact finders like the courts.
Indeed, when the initial decision in an agency lacks the crucial
procedural safeguards, the Administrative Procedure Act requires
75
the federal courts to review both fact and law de novo.
The sources of the Seventh Circuit's findings in Ramsey are
drawn from both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
Supreme Court precedent.
According to the APA, when an
agency's findings lack substantive and procedural due process
protections, they are subject to "trial de novo by the reviewing
court." 76 As an example, the Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 77 found that a federal highway administrator's
approval of funding for a highway that traversed a public park
lacked adequate factual findings relating to an alternate route as
required by law. Hence, the Supreme Court ordered the district

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1183.
77 F.3d 199, 204 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 205.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2000).
401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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court to conduct a plenary review of the Secretary of
Transportation's findings and directed that the trial court "may
require the administrative officials who participated in the
Volpe
decision to give testimony explaining their action."78
therefore illustrates that accepted principles of administrative law
would allow for a trial de novo in claims where agency findings are
devoid of due process and procedural protections, yet in ERISA
benefits disputes, courts have been routinely according the same
deference to insurers' decisions as they would a Social Security
79
decision issued by an administrative law judge.
VII. ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR DISALLOWING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONCEPTS

Such a mistaken application of an administrative law model
to ERISA benefit cases is unfortunate. While the statute refers to
the party determining claims as an "administrator," that term is
not interchangeable with what is meant by an agency
administrator, as we have seen. Nonetheless, the ERISA statute's
use of some of the same nomenclature utilized in administrative
law has undoubtedly confused the courts and has led to an overly
restrictive scope of review even when a deferential standard of
review is compelled.
The implications of this conclusion are numerous. First, by
applying an inappropriate administrative law model in
adjudicating ERISA cases, the courts unduly restrict discovery,
which prevents exposure of faulty decisions rendered by biased or
unqualified decisionmakers or whose determinations result from
Although some courts allow
flawed or incomplete evidence.
discovery on the conflict of interest,8 0 other rulings have
disallowed plaintiffs in disability benefit disputes from deposing a
consultant hired by an insurer on the ostensible ground that to
allow the examination would be inconsistent with ERISA. 8 '

78. Id. at 420.
79 Indeed, the deference accorded to insurers' decisions may be even
greater than deference given to agency determinations: "The 'arbitrary or
capricious' standard calls for less searching inquiry than the "substantial
evidence" standard that applies to Social Security disability cases." Pokratz v.
Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985).
80. See generally Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11789 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002); Waggener v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22697 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2002); Medford v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2288 (D. Nev. Feb. 10, 2003); Pulliam v. Cont'l Cas.
Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10010 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2003).
81. See, e.g., Abram v. Cargill, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7027, *8 (D.
Minn. Feb. 10, 2003) (showing one court's refusal to allow plaintiff to depose
doctor who had examined plaintiff); Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2004

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6759 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2004) (disallowing inquiry into
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Perlman,further suggested that:
discovery may be appropriate to investigate a claim that the plan's
administrator did not do what it said it did-that, for example, the
application was thrown in the trash rather than evaluated on the
merits. But when there can be no doubt that the application was
given a genuine evaluation, judicial review is limited to the evidence
that was submitted in support of the application for benefits, and
the mental processes of the plan's administrator are not legitimate
grounds of inquiry any more than they would be if the
82
decisionmaker were an administrative agency.

This approach is not only illogical; it is unfair. As previously
noted, Richardson v. Perales83 highlights the significant
differences between administrative proceedings and ERISA cases.
Focusing on due process in Social Security disability claims, the
Supreme Court determined that a claimant's due process rights
are protected by the right to issue subpoenas and cross-examine
witnesses before an objective, neutral factfinder. No comparable
right exists in ERISA claims. There is no subpoena power prior to
suit, and rarely is there an opportunity to present testimonial
evidence and elicit cross-examination during the claim process.
Particularly in view of the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Black
& Decker DisabilityPlan v. Nord,8 4 which held that deference need
not be accorded to the opinions of treating doctors in ERISA
benefits cases, claimants lack a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the opinions of consultants retained by plans if there is
no right to cross-examination.8 5 However, such unquestioned
opinions may be determinative of the outcome of the claim under a
86
deferential standard of review.

potential financial bias of consultant retained by benefit plan). See fn. 85
below.
82. 195 F.3d at 982.
83. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
84. 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
85. However, the Court did point out in Nord:
As compared to consultants retained by a plan, it may be true that
treating physicians, as a rule, have a greater opportunity to know and
observe the patient as an individual. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Nor do we question the Court of Appeals' concern that
physicians repeatedly retained by benefits plans may have an incentive
to make a finding of "not disabled" in order to save their employers
money and to preserve their own consulting arrangements.
Id. at 1971.
86. See Rhodes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11779 (N.D.
Tex. July 10, 2003) (offering a clear example of this point). Despite an
independent medical examination favoring an award of disability benefits, the
court upheld a benefit denial based on the opinion of a consultant retained by
the insurer to review the evidence without conducting a medical examination
of the claimant. Id. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court
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Moreover, the results of discovery, when undertaken, often
reveal the lack of substantial evidence supporting the insurer's
decision.
In Bedrick v. Travelers Insurance Co.,8 7 a health
insurance benefits case involving the refusal of an insurer to
certify as medically necessary certain prescribed therapies for a
child suffering from cerebral palsy, the plaintiff established, by
taking the depositions of defendant's consultants, that the
consultants had no relevant expertise regarding the medical
necessity of treatment they had refused to certify. Thus, in this
rare instance where discovery was permitted, the plaintiff was
able to elicit evidence not otherwise contained in the claim record
that convinced the court the decision to deny benefits was an
abuse of discretion.
Of at least equal, if not greater consequence than a denial of
discovery, though, is the limitation placed on the scope of the
court's review when administrative law concepts are applied to
ERISA claims. Consistent with the Supreme Court's injunction in
Firestonethat claimants should not fare worse under ERISA than
prior to that law's enactment, no justification exists for limiting
the evidence reviewable by the court, particularly with respect to
"claims which would have been insurance contract claims prior to
ERISA,"s as the court in Quesinberry noted.
Along those same lines, although jury trials have been denied
in ERISA cases,8 9 there is no justification for such a conclusion,
particularly in view of Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No.
391 v. Terry,90 which explained that to discern the availability of
trial by jury, there must first be a comparison of the claim brought
to actions in eighteenth century England before the merger of
courts of law and equity. Second, and most important, the court
must "examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is
legal or equitable in nature."91 ERISA claims seek recovery for
92
what is, in essence, a breach of contract. Thus, Bona v. Barasch
found a right to a jury trial for benefit claims based on the
Supreme Court's ruling in Great West Life & Annuity Insurance
Co. v. Knudson, 93 which drew a distinction between "equitable"

found that it was not arbitrary and capricious to deny benefits in the face of
such evidence. Id.
87. 93 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 1996).
88. 987 F.2d at 1027.
89. See Thomas v. Or. Fruit Prod. Co., 228 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that due to the type of remedy involved, and the lack of a constitutional
requirement, there is no right to a jury trial in ERISA claims).
90. 494 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1990).
91. Id. at 565.
92. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003).
93. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
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claims brought pursuant to Section 502(a)(3) 94 of ERISA and
"legal" claims brought pursuant to Section 502(a)(1)(B). 95 The
court elaborated:
Although [Great-West] did not deal with the right to a jury trial per
se, the Supreme Court's explication of the distinction between law
and equity, discussed in detail in Part III, is relevant here as well.
As I concluded in Part III, the monetary relief sought by plaintiffs in
this case cannot be characterized as equitable relief under GreatWest. Rather, plaintiffs seek damages from the trustees on behalf of
the Employee Benefit Funds. Because they seek money damages
rather than an equitable remedy, both Miranda and Individual
Plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial on their ERISA claims. Cf.
White v. Martin, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6899, 2002 WL 598432, at 4
(D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2002) (concluding that a plaintiff seeking
equitable restitution is not entitled to a jury trial in a suit based on
section 502(a)(2) but implying that after Great-West a plaintiff
seeking money damages under ERISA would be entitled to a jury
trial).
All of these factors add up to a conclusion that ERISA benefits
cases should be decided as they were resolved prior to the passage
of the ERISA law and not under an administrative law paradigm.
VIII. THE MISUSE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Because of ongoing confusion relating to the application of
administrative law to ERISA claims, the use of summary
judgment as a means of resolving disputes has been distorted.
Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
96
a judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court explained that in order to avoid summary
judgment, the opponent must show "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party" in
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.97 Abandoning that paradigm in
ERISA cases, though, courts have granted summary judgment by
The recent ruling in
applying a substantial evidence test.
Brigham v. Sun Life of Canada,98 a disability benefit case,

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
Id. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2003).
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
317 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2003).
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provides an example. Applying a deferential standard of review,
the court held:
The question we face in this appeal is "not which side we believe is
right, but whether [the insurer] had substantial evidentiary grounds
for a reasonable decision in its favor." Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184. We
share the district court's sentiment that this is a difficult case
because of "the obvious courage plaintiff has shown in facing his
disability," 183 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
Beyond this, it seems counterintuitive that a paraplegic suffering
serious muscle strain and pain, severely limited in his bodily
functions, would not be deemed totally disabled. Moreover, it seems
clear that Sun Life has taken a minimalist view of the record. But it
is equally true that the hurdle plaintiff had to surmount,
establishing his inability to perform any occupation for which he
could be trained, was a high one. As to that issue, we have to agree
with the district court that the undisputed facts of record do not
permit us to find that Sun Life acted in an arbitrary or capricious
manner in terminating appellant Brigham's benefits. 99
Despite the court's reference to "undisputed facts," as the
dissent pointed out, "there was significant and unrebutted
evidence that in his current condition [Brigham] was unable to
work consistently." 10 0 Thus, instead of examining the evidence to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact could be
discerned, the court simply affirmed the termination of disability
payments because it did not find the insurer's decision irrational.
It works the other way as well. The Ninth Circuit decision
reversed by the Supreme Court is a perfect example. In Nord v.
Black & Decker Disability Plan,10 1 the court was faced with a
conflict in the evidence-the insured, who was claiming disability
benefits due to a spinal impairment, submitted evidence from
treating physicians finding him disabled.
Black & Decker's
independent examining physician, however, opined that Nord,
while impaired, was not disabled from performing the duties of his
occupation.
After reciting the standards for summary judgment noted
above, and despite the obvious conflict in the evidence, the court
reversed the district court's grant of judgment to the defendant.
Even though the plan language granted discretion to the disability
benefit plan administrator, the court found the administrator was
operating under a conflict of interest manifested by the plan's
rejection of the treating physicians' opinions without articulation

99. Id. at 85-6.

100. Id. at 86 (Stahl, J., dissenting).
101. 296 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2002) vacated by 538 U.S. 822, remanded to 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 996 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2004).
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of legitimate reasons based on the record. 10 2 After finding the
failure to credit the treating physicians' opinions created a conflict
of interest, which altered what would otherwise be a deferential
standard of review to a plenary standard, the court then analyzed
whether a genuine issue of material fact existed. Amazingly, the
court then stated:
The only evidence advanced by Black & Decker to dispute the
evidence of Nord's disability is Dr. Mitri's opinion [the independent
medical examiner] that Nord is capable of performing sedentary
work. A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly
probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact. We
conclude that the lone opinion of Dr. Mitri, the doctor hired by Black
& Decker, could not reasonably overcome all the other evidence
demonstrating that Nord is disabled.
Dr. Mitri's opinion is
overwhelmed by substantial evidence in the record, including the
opinions of three treating physicians that Nord's condition rendered
him unable to meet the physical requirements of his position as a
Material Planner. Viewing the administrative record as a whole, we
conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Nord is
not disabled. Therefore, we grant Nord's motion for summary
103
judgment.
This statement is clearly an expression of administrative law
principles since the "substantial evidence" test is derived from
administrative law. 0 4 However, despite the court's determination
that no reasonable factfinder could conclude Nord was not
disabled, common sense suggests the opinion of the specialist
examiner hired to evaluate Nord represented more than a
"scintilla of evidence," and was an evidentiary opinion that created
a genuine issue of fact.
Certainly, in reversing the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the
Supreme Court was troubled by that conclusion, although for
different reasons. The basis of the Supreme Court's ruling was
that adherence to the treating physician's opinion was not
mandatory as it is in Social Security adjudications. In Social
102. Id. at 831. The Court stated:
Nowhere in the record is any reason advanced as to why the treating
physicians' opinions were unreliable and Dr. Mitri's more reliable.
No evidence has been advanced that Nord's treating physicians
considered inappropriate factors in making their diagnosis or that
Nord's physicians lacked the requisite expertise to draw their
medical conclusions. Instead, the administrator appears merely to
have preferred to rely upon the more favorable conclusions of its own
examiner.
Id.
103. Id. at 832 (citations omitted).
104. Substantial evidence is defined in administrative law as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson,402 U.S. at 401.

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:727

Security disability adjudications, by regulation, 105 the Social
Security Administration has determined the treating physician's
opinion is entitled to deference where the doctor is a specialist, has
a lengthy treatment relationship with the patient, and offers an
opinion consistent with the objective test results and in harmony
with the record as a whole. No similar regulation has been
promulgated by the United States Department of Labor, 106 though;
an omission crucial to the Supreme Court's 07 refusal to adopt a
"treating physician rule."
IX. THE SOLUTION
Therefore, to halt the slide toward administrative law, it is
obvious the courts must either return to the summary judgment
paradigm or find a suitable replacement. Several courts have
suggested that Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of
law in bench trials, is the appropriate means of resolving ERISA
benefits disputes (assuming jury trials are disallowed). Such a
procedure was recommended in Kearney v. Standard Insurance
Co.108 and in Wilkins v. Baptist Healthcare System Inc. 10 9 Other
courts have followed suit. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in
Hess v. Hartford,110 suggested the use of a "paper trial" as akin to
a bench trial. Under such a proceeding, rather than examining
the record to search for genuine issues of material fact, the court
weighs the evidence and decides which party has presented a more
persuasive case.
While the paper trial approach offers simplicity and an
expeditious means of resolving employee benefit disputes under a
de novo standard of review, both full-blown trials and paper trials
are problematic under a deferential standard of review since that
standard implies an inherent conflict in the evidence resolved by a
party having discretion to determine disputes. Unless the courts
suddenly decide that a deferential standard of review is
inappropriate in ERISA claim litigation, the question of what
constitutes a "genuine issue of material fact" is difficult to resolve.
105. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527; 416.927 (2003).
106. The Department of Labor is the federal agency having jurisdiction over
administration and enforcement of the ERISA law.
107. See Black & Decker Disability Plan, 538 U.S. 822 (holding that the
appellate court erred by employing a "treating physician rule" and refusing to
adopt such a rule).
108. 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999).
109. 150 F.3d 609, 620 (6th Cir. 1998) (Gilman, R., concurring).
110. Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir.
2001). See also Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119, 124-25 (2d
Cir. 2003) (stating that trial court failed to make express findings of fact as
required by FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
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Under a deferential standard of review,
the fiduciary must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." . . . In
reviewing that explanation, we must "consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment."... Normally, [a decision
by a plan administrator] would be arbitrary and capricious if the
[administrator] relied on factors which Congress had not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before [it] or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of [its] expertise.111

Other examples of arbitrary and capricious conduct include
situations where the plain language or structure of the plan or
simple common sense will require the court to pronounce an
arbitrary and capricious. 112
determination
administrator's
Likewise, "the fact that an administrator blatantly disregards an
applicant's submissions can be evidence of arbitrary and
113
capricious action."
Yet just because a decision may fail one of these tests does not
necessarily make it wrong. Thus, if the court finds a benefit
determination is deficient in one or more of the above respects but
is not necessarily the incorrect decision, the court could then
conduct a "paper trial" to resolve the claim. Of course, there will
be some cases where a determination is completely rational and
without any genuine conflict, and summary judgment against the
claimant would be the appropriate course. In other cases, the
evidence will be one-sided in the other direction, and the plaintiff
will be granted summary judgment. However, in the "garden
variety" case, there will almost always be a conflict in the
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
112. See Hess, 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding denial of disability
benefits arbitrary and capricious). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
Comm. d states:
Factors in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion. In
determining the question whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of
discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power, the following
circumstances may be relevant: (1) the extent of the discretion conferred
upon the trustee by the terms of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust;
(3) the nature of the power; (4) the existence or nonexistence, the
definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the
reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of
the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power; (6) the
existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with
that of the beneficiaries.
113. 274 F.3d at 463.
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evidence, and neither summary judgment nor the application of an
administrative law paradigm is an appropriate means of disposing
of the claim. A "paper trial" or comparable summary adjudication
is therefore necessary.
That approach is more consistent with civil litigation practice
than a remand of a case, which again shows a mistaken
application of administrative law concepts, a point duly noted by
Judge Frank Easterbrook in Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corporation:
Although it is doubtful as an original matter that a district court
may "remand" ERISA claims, as if to administrative agencies, we
have held that courts may treat welfare benefit plans just like
administrative law judges implementing the Social Security
disability-benefits program. Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass'n, 161 F.3d 472, 476-78 (7th Cir. 1998); Schleibaum v. Kmart,
153 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 1998).114

Nowhere in the ERISA law is there authority for a remand;
certainly, in other civil disputes of a comparable nature, no insurer
would seriously argue to the court for the right to a remand. Yet
the courts continue to make ridiculous distinctions about the
resolution of ERISA benefit cases. In Hackett v. Xerox Corporation
Long-Term Disability Plan,115 the court concluded the decision to
remand should be based on whether the claim involves an initial
determination or if the matter involves a termination of benefits,
such as disability insurance payments, which had been ongoing.
Hackett explains:
[i]n a case where the plan administrator did not afford adequate
procedures in its initial denial of benefits, the appropriate remedy
respecting the status quo and correcting for the defective procedures
is to provide the claimant with the procedures that she sought in the
first place. Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 394. If the claimant prevails on
remand before the plan administrator, then the claimant would be
entitled to retroactive benefits from the time at which the initial
denial occurred. Id. However the court is not in the place to make
the determination of entitlement to benefits. The court must not
substitute its own judgment for that of the administrator. Quinn,
161 F.3d at 478; see also Gallo v. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 923
(7th Cir. 1996). The fact that the plan administrator failed to
provide the adequate procedures does not mean that the claimant is
automatically entitled to benefits-such a holding might provide the
claimant "with an economic windfall should she be determined not
disabled upon a proper reconsideration." Quinn, 161 F.3d at 478.
On the other hand are cases where the plan administrator
terminated. benefits under defective procedures. In these cases the

114. Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp., 195 F.3d at 978.
115. 315 F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 2003).
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status quo prior to the defective procedure was the continuation of
benefits. Remedying the defective procedures requires a
116
reinstatement of benefits.
This ruling may be appropriate in analyzing Social Security
disability benefit disputes, but it has no support in the ERISA
statutory language. If a decision regarding benefit eligibility is
both defective and wrong, there is no reason why a claimant
should be denied benefits. The court in Hackett speaks of a
potential "windfall" to claimants, but there is no unjust
enrichment where the evidence before the court justifies the
benefit payment. The court further notes, in cases involving
ongoing benefit payments, the employee benefit plan remains free
to investigate ongoing eligibility to receive benefits.
Philosophically, the notion of a remand is antagonistic to our
system of civil jurisprudence; moreover, it defeats the
Congressional purpose of the ERISA statute. A law designed for
the protection of plan participants and their beneficiaries fails to
meet that goal where plan administrators are given multiple
opportunities to shore up a defective record and benefits due are
either delayed or denied. After the parties conduct a pre-suit
appeal, the matter is ripe for judicial determination; and the
courts fail in their role as arbiters of disputes when they remand
claims rather than deciding them, even in cases where there may
only be procedural defects but not necessarily a wrong decision.
Although courts are loathe to become claim administrators, they
necessarily fulfill that function in numerous comparable instances
such as employment disputes and insurance coverage litigation;
and without any statutory basis for a remand, courts are required
to fulfill that role in ERISA cases as well.
X.

CONCLUSION

The congressional purpose behind the enactment of the
ERISA law has been thwarted by the courts' misapplication of an
administrative law framework in resolving benefit disputes. By
forgetting that ERISA benefit disputes are dissimilar from
administrative proceedings in several key respects, courts have
created a system of unfair, summary claim dispositions
inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is
both an historic anomaly and contrary to the ERISA legislation
and the goals Congress sought to achieve.
Courts must be wary of avoiding the temptation to use the
term "administrative record," or to speak of "administrative
exhaustion." Such language has no place in the ERISA law. As
116. Id.
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we have seen, the "review" in ERISA cases is markedly different
from review of administrative decisions; and there is no basis for
according either the same degree of deference to such findings or
the same review procedures. Nonetheless, pending reversal by the
Supreme Court, the Firestone ruling commits the courts to a
deferential standard of review where an employee benefit plan
contains the appropriate language, although we have seen that
even the trust law approach is inappropriate where the benefit
plan is unfunded or funded by insurance. Although the potential
for a conflict of interest by the party determining benefits which
also pays the benefits out of its general assets may be fertile
ground for diminishing the discretion accorded, the Supreme
Court has never clarified how a conflict is to be evaluated. While
some courts find the presence of a conflict to render the claim
decision presumptively void, 117 other courts either give no
consideration to a conflict 118 or apply a sliding scale, diminishing
deference based on the degree to which the conflict infected the
decision. 119
Thus, given the inconsistency in the courts'
application of the conflict of interest, a more workable rule needs
to be developed to reconcile a deferential standard of review with
the civil procedure accorded by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
An additional consideration is to meet a desired goal of
having claims processed "efficiently and fairly." 20 It makes little
sense to conduct broad-ranging discovery in every case where a
health insurer has denied reimbursement for a $50.00 medical
procedure. Nonetheless, in certain cases where the insurer has
arguably engaged in bad faith or a pattern of denying similar
claims, it may be justifiable to allow latitude to the plaintiff to
expose the defendant's misconduct.
Federal courts have the authority to invoke Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to manage cases. In the example
above, it may be suitable to allow a minimal number of depositions
to gain a better understanding of the insurer's actions, and if a
pattern can be developed, further discovery might be granted. It
may also be appropriate to conduct jury trials in certain cases.
However, as a practical matter, no claimant will seek broad
117. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 898 F.2d 1556, 1563 (11th Cir.
1990) cert. denied 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). See also, Fought v. Unum Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 357 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2004) (third party insurer required to
establish reasonableness of decision by preponderance of the evidence in order
to avoid taint of conflict of interest).
118. Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan,
144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998).
119. Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir.

2000).
120. Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 1992).
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discovery and a jury trial over a claim of modest value. It would
be uneconomical for the client to pay fees that outweigh the value
of the claim. It would also create a significant risk that a court
would apply its discretion to deny an award of attorneys' fees 121 on
the ground that the recovery was too insignificant to justify a fee
award.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain a great deal of
flexibility to assist the courts in expeditiously resolving disputes
under ERISA in a fair and efficient manner. The trend of utilizing
paper trials as an alternative to summary judgment has been a
creative and well-received approach 122 that balances the value of
employee's claim against the cost of a full-blown jury trial. The
paper trial mechanism also works under a deferential standard of
review where the plaintiff can establish that the claim
determination demonstrates arbitrary or capricious behavior. In
such a case, the plan or insurer would still retain the ability to
demonstrate the decision was correct.
However, the single most important goal is to meet Congress's
intent that the ERISA law assures protection and provides
remedies to plan participants and their beneficiaries. 1 23 The
administrative law model of adjudicating ERISA cases completely
frustrates that end and merely encourages more claim denials that
are all but immune to challenge when claimants are denied
routine civil procedures such as discovery and the right to a
hearing before a neutral, unbiased factfinder. As Bedrick so
dramatically demonstrated, discovery fulfils a necessary purpose
and exposes the poverty of Judge Easterbrook's comment in
Perlman that claimants should not be allowed to investigate the
underpinnings of claim decisions. Nor can anyone disagree with
Professor Wigmore's assertion that cross-examination is "beyond
any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth."' 24 Claimants need those protections, which will only be
available when courts dispense with the myth that ERISA cases
are governed by administrative review proceedings and recognize
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all civil actions,
including ERISA cases.

121. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2000) provides courts with discretion to award
attorneys' fees.
122. See generally Morton Denlow, Trial on the Papers: An Alternative to
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Aug. 1999, at
30-34 (exploring a trial on the papers as a time and work-saving judicial
device).
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
124. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974).

